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Summary
The paper analyzes the global rise in with-in countries inequality, with special 
emphasis on the sharp increase in inequality beginning in the 1980s, as a re-
sult of the neoliberal policy reforms that were designed to prevent economic 
stagnation and decline by reiterating the importance of financial deregulation 
and trade liberalisation. Following this worldwide trend, the paper employs 
different theoretical frameworks in order to explain how a further increase 
in income inequality could lead to the formation of violent conflict. By using 
frustration, identity and opportunity factors, the authors attempt to illustrate 
how the “search for more” is transformed into violence, followed by mate-
rial and human casualties. Finally, the paper analyzes different instruments 
and policies that could reduce inequality, e.g. tax and transfer systems (the 
impact on income distribution), labour market policies (the trade-off between 
high minimal wage and employment reduction) and institutions and education 
policies (through strengthening public education, in particular). An adequate 
policy response to rising inequality, according to the authors, should include 
all of these complementary measures.
Keywords: Economic Inequality, Conflict, Violence, Relative Deprivation, Re-
sources Mobilisation, Horizontal Inequalities
Why Inequality Matters
Socio-economic factors have not always been a focus of the research on causes of 
violent conflicts. More often, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, they attracted 
1 The first draft of the paper was presented at XVII Italian Political Science Association An-
nual Conference held in Florence, 12-14 September 2013. We are especially thankful to Matteo 
Albertini for his comments and suggestions.
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interest as factors which can exacerbate, but not induce incompatibility formation. 
Contrary to this, in the last decade a lot of research (both qualitative and quantita-
tive) has been done investigating the correlation between: economic inequality, vio-
lent conflicts and the onset of civil wars (refer to Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002 
and Buhaug et al., 2011). The reasons for this are twofold.
First and foremost, economic inequality has today reached its historic maxi-
mum. This is not only the case at the national level but at the international level as 
well. Recent findings have shown that the with-in country inequality has risen in 
most parts of the world since WWII, with sharp and constant increases since the 
beginning of the 1980s. This is the case not only in countries of the Global South 
(former Third World countries) where inequality is very persistent (due to their co-
lonial past, bad governance, ill imposed international aid/policies, etc.), but also in 
the most developed regions of the Global North (such as North America and West-
ern Europe) where this trend has not been previously present. 
Findings (Cornia, 2003) show that during the last three decades inequality has 
increased up to 30% in the UK (followed by a similar trend in France, Italy and Hol-
land), 50% in Japan, while in the former Soviet republics (such as Russian Federa-
tion, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) it increased more than twofold. A similar trend is 
present in the US, where income inequality rose from 35 to 47 Gini points in the same 
period (for details see Stiglitz, 2012). The most drastic case is the People’s Republic 
of China, were inequality tripled since the beginning of the 1980s when this coun-
try started to implement market led reforms. Parallels can be made for other regions 
(sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern Cone, central Asia), with the exception of Latin 
America since the 2000s, where inequality rates have dropped in most countries of 
the continent due to the rise of the New Left governments and the importance given 
to the reduction of inequalities in their socio-economic policies (Cornia, 2010).
A similar situation may also be observed at the inter-country level where the 
gap between the richest and the poorest is even more pronounced. An addition-
al problem is associated with the “geography of inequality”, with one side con-
sisting of the wealthiest countries, being almost exclusively from Europe, North 
America and Australia, and the other comprised of countries from the Global South 
(Milanovic, 2007). At the same time, middle-income countries (mostly from Latin 
America and Eastern Europe) have over time dropped to the lower-income group, 
making the differentiation even more pronounced. Additionally, global inequality 
(between individuals at the world level) by 2005 reached 70 Gini points, which is 
significantly higher than previously calculated (Milanovic, 2012).
Secondly, the negative trend is explained by policy reforms implemented world-
wide since the 1980s, with the emphasis on the importance of deregulation and li-
beralization (including labour market reforms, elimination of trade barriers and the 
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free flow of financial capital) for preventing economic stagnation and decline (see 
Stewart and Berry, 1999). With regard to less developed states (LDC) where ine-
quality is the highest, change was additionally exacerbated by structural adjustment 
programmes implemented by Breton Woods institutions as a response to economic 
imbalances, high deficits and external debt in this period. These policies implied re-
ductions in state expenditure (employment cuts, currency devaluation, discontinua-
tion of subsidies, decreases in income tax, pay-as-you-go social services, etc.), i.e. 
in secondary incomes, which affected the middle class and the poor. Drawing from 
these facts, Auvinen (1996) reaches the conclusion that: the longer the history of 
structural adjustment programmes and IMF involvement in the economic reforms 
of a country, the greater the likelihood that political conflicts will occur.
The transfer of economic control to the private sector brought higher per-capita 
growth (although not consistently), but at the same time caused an increase in in-
equality, since the new (neoliberal) model implied dramatic reduction of redistri-
bution mechanisms, which were pivotal for the economic policies in the decades 
before that (such as the welfare state in Europe, the ISI model in Latin America, 
command economy of former socialist countries, development state in East Asia, 
etc). As a result, the rise of with-in country and inter-country inequality reached a 
new maximum by the 2000s, but has been additionally exacerbated since 2008, with 
the imposition of austerity measures worldwide (Muller, 2013).
Hence, the events occurring in the last couple of years in Europe, the US, the 
Middle East and Latin America are the main indicator that the change of economic 
model has not only welfare-related, but social costs as well. 
The most drastic is the example of Tunisia where internal conflict has resulted 
in a political transformation of the country. However, despite the importance of 
the democratisation processes, what is more significant is the fact that the violence 
started due to pronounced economic disparities, and only later did it acquire a po-
litical character. A similar situation is evident in other countries in Northern Africa 
and the Middle East. The protests in Europe and in the United States did not have 
such drastic consequences, but they nonetheless remain a clear indicator that sig-
nificant increase in inequality in these parts of the world cannot prevail with ex-
isting economic policies. Mobilisation is especially visible in the US, Greece and 
Spain where discontent is increasingly transformed into frustration and directed 
towards state institutions, which are proving incapable of resolving these problems 
(Džuverović, 2013: 133).
Similar problems are present in countries like Iceland (2009), Israel (2011), 
Bulgaria, China and Brazil (2013) where economic hardship has brought social un-
rest that could lead to more pronounced violence if the causes for these protests are 
not properly and immediately addressed.
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The result of all this is that economic inequality is becoming more important 
for peace and conflict research. For that reason, it is imperative to address the pos-
sibility that the economic factors may now be the leading, if not the sole causes of 
conflict formation. Moreover, if this proves to be true, the formulation of strategies 
for reducing income inequality will become increasingly significant. This is why 
this paper analyses the possibility of changing existing policies, and introducing 
new instruments for inequality reduction. If these efforts prove successful, innova-
tions might also be used in formulating conflict prevention strategies.
But, before suggesting what could be done, it is necessary to present more theo-
retical insights on how the relation between inequality and conflict is formed, and 
why a search for more can sometimes also entail the resort to violence.
In Search for a Theoretical Explanation
Many of the most prominent works examining the relationship between inequal-
ity and conflict have emphasised the importance of psychological factors. This was 
based on the early work of Dollard et al. (1939), who noted that frustration appears 
when an individual is deprived from achieving a certain goal, which is followed by 
psychological tension that can be released only by aggression directed towards the 
cause of frustration or some other, alternative target. Subsequent work by Berko-
witz (1972) made a distinction between aggression and readiness for aggression and 
detailed the conditions under which aggression may appear, which was essential for 
further development of the hypothesis. 
Davies’s (1962) work on revolution, Gurr’s (1970) on political violence and 
Runciman’s (1966) on social inequality in twentieth-century England clearly 
showed that the resort to violence is often a psychological response to deprivation 
caused by political and economic factors (and state institutions) which prevent indi-
viduals from fulfilling expectations by using their present capabilities. Accordingly, 
violence may be the result of negative deprivation (a decrease in capabilities), but 
can also be an emotional response to positive trends if the individual in question is 
left out (an increase in expectation without enhanced capabilities). It is important to 
note that in both models, frustration (and subsequent conflict) could result as a di-
rect consequence of an individual’s unequal status (compared to others), especially 
during prolonged intervals of economic downturn (for example the financial crisis 
in South Asia in 1997 or in North America and Europe in 2008).2
2 In Galtung’s view (1964) deprivation is not always clear-cut. Individuals can be, for example, 
economically deprived but at the same time have considerable political influence, or vice versa. 
Still, according to him, aggression caused by deprivation is most plausible if socio-economic 
factors are in the state of disequilibrium that he describes as the discrepancy between how indi-
viduals see themselves and how they are perceived by the system.
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These assumptions were confirmed by the empirical research of Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) who examined the correlation between economic inequalities and 
political instability i.e. economic investments, and Auvinen and Nafziger’s (1999) 
study on complex humanitarian emergencies which demonstrated a robust correla-
tion between economic inequality and man made crisis (involving human suffering, 
physical violence and displacement, followed by diseases and hunger), with the 
prospect of negative influence of other economic factors such as economic regress, 
the failure of external economic adjustment, low GDP growth, high inflation or in-
creased military expenditures.3 Similar results were found in recent research involv-
ing group deprivation (refer to Walker and Smith, 2001).
Contrary to this, the resource mobilisation hypothesis stresses the importance 
of organisational factors in conflict formation. In this context, the resort to violence 
is dependent primarily upon the interest of disenfranchised individuals, and not 
of their psychological characteristics (the so-called rational-choice model). This is 
closely related to the ability of individuals to take action as a coherent group and 
to act upon opportunities most favourable to them at a given moment. If this is ful-
filled, it could lead to collective action and, if the group’s demands are not satisfied, 
cause rebellion followed by large-scale violence.
This model is, according to Tilly (1978), especially applicable to revolutionary 
outcomes in which an unsatisfied group(s) mobilises in order to oust the govern-
ment responsible for the given situation. If the group’s interest is clearly present, re-
sources well accessible and opportunities favourable to the group (see Gurr’s [2000] 
work on internal and external opportunities), it could lead to action resulting in the 
government’s overthrow.4 It should be taken into account that regime repressiveness 
can be only limitedly responsible for violence (Muller, 1985), while inequality is 
decisive for group mobilisation (Muller, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987).
Recently, in their study on “greed and grievance” Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
have emphasised the significance of greed in conflict formation. In their view, 
grievances, which may derive from political exclusion or inter-ethnic and religious 
hatred, can only be partly accountable for violence, while greed generates most of 
the incompatibilities between the parties involved. As in the case of the mobilisa-
tion hypothesis, organised (and lucrative) activity cannot be neglected because it 
constitutes a starting point for parties’ behaviour. According to the authors, the best 
evidence for this is given by the “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) across Africa, financed 
3 In subsequent study Nafziger and Auvinen (2003) made a distinction between class and com-
munal (regional, ethnic and religious) economic inequalities with a notion that potential overlap 
could exacerbate grievances and potential strife.
4 Moore (1966) predicts the possibility of different revolutionary outcomes, out of which one 
entails divided authority between revolutionary and contra-revolutionary (government) forces.
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by illicit activities (the war economy), prolonged by high intensity mobilisation (by 
media, religion and fear) and organised with foreign (regional) support, with the 
main purpose of acquiring economic benefits for the warring fractions.
Lastly, more research was done on cross-cutting inequalities with the assertion 
on the role of group membership, which contrasts relative deprivation and the mo-
bilisation hypotheses that place individuals in the centre of the discussion. 
In this perspective, group identity is essential for explaining horizontal in-
equalities with the notion that membership is not always just a preference of in-
dividuals (self-perception), but also of those who are outside the group (Stewart, 
2008). Hence, mobility between groups is not exclusively a matter of choice (or a 
possibility), but rather an imposed option, which is why in societies with distinct 
inter-group boundaries horizontal inequalities are increasingly important.5
It is obvious that not all horizontal inequalities are equally important. Some 
have more bearing since they influence group (and its members’) behaviour and 
its position in the society more than others (for example political exclusion com-
pared to limited access to health services). What is important is that unequal access 
to economic resources by different groups can reduce welfare of the individuals in 
the losing groups above what their individual position would merit, because their 
self-esteem is bound up with the progress of the group (Stewart, 2002: 3). In oth-
er words, absolute deprivation of the group translates into relative deprivation of 
group members. If that is the case than societies with prominent economic inequali-
ties are more vulnerable to the probability of violence outbursts. This is why Østby 
(2008) concludes that countries with strong democratic tradition and politically in-
clusive systems, if economically unequal, can be subject to domestic clashes.
In the situation where developed countries (DC) experience an increase in in-
ter-group economic differentiation, understanding horizontal inequalities becomes 
increasingly important for conflict prevention. The same could be said for LDCs 
where benefits from increased economic growth are not evenly distributed or where 
the trickle-down effect is missing.
A plethora of different theoretical assumptions suggests that this issue raised a 
lot of concerns in the past, but more recently as well, especially with the extensive 
works on horizontal inequalities by Stewart and others and Nafziger’s and Auvi-
nen’s study of complex humanitarian emergencies. Also, theoretical considerations 
can be viewed as a reaction to events taking place worldwide; some of them are 
briefly mentioned in this paper. This is why practical implication must be consid-
5 According to Stewart (2008) individuals possess multiple memberships, some of them being 
completely detached from one another (for example ethnicity and religion in Nigeria); others 
intertwined (caste and ethnicity in India) or possibly overlapped (race and ethnicity in Central 
America).
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ered, and, if possible, new socio-economic policies formulated in order to prevent 
theoretical predictions regarding inequality-induced resort to violence.
Is There a Solution?
If a solution is to be effective, it does not necessarily have to eliminate inequalities, 
which is not achievable or necessarily desirable, but to decrease them to socially 
acceptable and long-term sustainable levels without entailing civil unrest. It would 
also suggest that local socio-economic policies and global paradigm shifts must be 
integrated and implemented simultaneously for this to be achieved.
Accordingly, the “great transformation” (Polanyi, 2001) should entail a replace-
ment of the present credo based on the permanent increase of effectiveness with the 
new one – solidarity. This is especially important in the moment of profound eco-
nomic hardship when all countries are affected and economic policies equally harm-
ful for everybody, and not just for LDCs as it was in the past (Chang, 2007). Potential 
transformation should not be only state-based, but should also include international 
organisations, development and aid agencies, social movements, NGOs and others 
capable of correcting the misdoings which have led to the present situation.
So far, the change is visible mostly in Latin America where the rise of the New 
Left since 2001 has brought a new impetus in the solidarity and egalitarian agenda. 
Drastic change, as in cases of Bolivia and Venezuela with their indigenous and so-
cialist projects, is not a precondition for successful transformation, since other mo-
dels, more moderate, may prove to be equally (or more) successful.6
As mentioned, the global shift must necessarily be accompanied by a change at 
the local level. Firstly, austerity measures need to be reduced to a minimum. By look-
ing at Greece, Spain and Portugal, it is evident these measures negatively influence 
the economic growth and increase the inequality by affecting exclusively middle 
and lower-income groups (via cuts in education investments, decrease of funds al-
located for social services or increase in healthcare costs) (Stiglitz, 2012). Instead of 
austerity which proved to be very ineffective and unfair (Muller, 2013) governments 
should invest more in services for groups from the lower part of the income scale, 
with the purpose of increasing human capital and securing their long-term economic 
independency. By doing this, redistribution would be achieved along with the growth 
(Cornia, 2010), and not subsequently, which was (not) the case in the past. 
6 This relates to the question of how economic progress is achieved and sustained. Present eco-
nomic empowerment of Asian and Latin American countries can be seen as an indicator that, af-
ter a long period of time, the economic development of the Global South is now continuous and, 
more importantly, non-interfered. If this proves to be a long-tem trend, solidarity agenda could 
also be more welcomed in the Global North whose countries are experiencing systemic social 
and economic crisis, without prospects for positive change.
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As Stewart and Berry (1999: 151) note, the traditional tax system’s major pur-
pose is to correct inequalities (by direct taxation and increased state expenditure), 
while in the case of the neoliberal model it is to promote incentives and economic 
efficiency (reduced taxation and expenditures). Progressive fiscal policies are very 
important for fighting inequality because regressive tax systems make the poorest 
face a substantial tax burden while the richest are (de facto) exposed to moderate 
tax rates. This is why it is crucial for LDCs to transform their tax system according 
to the notion that progressive income taxation (income depreciation for the well-
off and improved returns for labour-only individuals) and the ability to collect re-
venues regularly could present an effective instrument for tackling income inequali-
ties (refer to Nafziger and Auvinen, 2003: 179-80). Also, revenue allocation must be 
distributed evenly across different groups in order to avoid the formation of persist-
ent horizontal inequalities. Finally, fiscal policies such as establishing wage ratio in 
the public sector (by determining maximum vs. minimum or via income groups) or 
guaranteed minimum wage should also be potentially discussed, both in DCs and 
LDCs.7 There are numerous interesting (and unorthodox) proposals and initiatives 
tackling these issues.8 It is very important to emphasise the existence of possible 
trade-offs between establishing a minimum wage and employment reduction. This 
policy in particular could have an impact on employment dynamics because ad-
ministrative decisions establishing too high levels of wage earnings may possibly 
decrease competitive performances of companies and reduce employment. Also, 
strengthening the role of trade unions through specific institutional arrangements 
can reduce inequality by providing a more equal distribution of labour income.9 
Unequal land distribution is one of the most important factors influencing in-
equality in LDCs because it contributes to low income for the majority of popula-
tion (Muller and Seligson, 1987). This is why land reform can be a very effective 
instrument for reducing rural inequality. In this context, parcels redistribution must 
be followed by other measures such as financial and technical support for new own-
ers, available infrastructure or mediation for resolving claim disputes. The example 
of Taiwan in the 1950s shows that if the political opposition is overcome, land dis-
7 Article 7 of Brazil’s Constitution guarantees ‘a minimum wage nationwide, established by 
law, capable of satisfying their basic living needs and those of their families with housing, food, 
education, health, leisure, clothing, hygiene, transportation, and social security, with periodical 
adjustments to maintain its purchasing power, it being forbidden to bind it for any purpose’.
8 The popular initiative in Switzerland, i.e. initiative 1:12, which aims to limit monthly CEOs 
salaries to twelve times the lowest salary in the company, or the proposal from Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions (ICTU) about narrowing the trade gap by suggesting wages that go beyond the esta-
blished ratio could not be deductible for income tax purposes, are just some of the examples.
9 The fall and rise of inequality in USA corresponds with the decline and increase of union mem-
bership.
Džuverović, N., Milošević, A., In Search for More: The Importance of Income Inequality...
181
tribution can have a strong positive impact on inequality. Otherwise, even the best 
land distribution strategies can prove to be ill-equipped and ineffective as shown in 
Iran (mid 1960s to mid 1970s) and Zimbabwe (in the 1990s).
More importantly, governments must spend increasingly on improving human 
capital. Only by doing this, other measures would reach their full effect. This im-
plies more investments in education with a purpose of attaining, if possible, free and 
universal schooling, from pre-school to the university level. By making educational 
services accessible to the majority, the state can increase knowledge and skills of 
overall population which can be beneficial in the labour market, and have a posi-
tive (income) effect. This especially refers to LDCs and developing countries whose 
investments in education are much lower compared to DCs (for details see OECD, 
2012).10 In the second case (developed countries), the problem associated with the 
restricted access to academic institutions due to large family income disparities and 
very high tuitions should also be addressed immediately since it is an important fac-
tor in bolstering intergeneration inequality.11
Related to this is also the question of accessible health services to lower-in-
come groups. Accessible primary care should be one of the priorities for every go-
vernment interested in the wellbeing of its citizens, especially because of the fact 
that longer and healthier life increases income for both the individuals (by higher 
earnings) and the state (increased tax returns), and has a positive impact on income 
inequality. This is especially important for LDCs where birth rates are very high 
and the majority of the population is deprived of any kind of medical assistance. 
Most recent efforts aimed at expanding medical services to the poor in Venezuela 
and Brazil have shown positive effects, and should be taken into consideration for 
future references. This is also related to the first point (solidarity), since some of 
these programmes are run with foreign support (in these cases most notably Cuba). 
Unfortunately, the example of the United States proves that expanding health ser-
vices is still far from being accepted as a practical and socially adequate solution for 
the inequality dilemma.
Likewise, most recent findings suggest that conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programmes could be a useful tool for alleviating poverty. These programmes as-
sume that money is transferred to households to help support them, providing they 
conform to certain expectations about school attendance and health-care check-ups 
of their youngest members. In other words, families get financial support for sending 
10 Inequalities in education are even more important if they cross cut with other inequalities 
(ethnic, religious, income, etc.), which often is the case in LDCs (for example Roma people in 
Eastern Europe or indigenous population in Central and South America).
11 The United States is the only developed country in which members of the age group 25-34 are 
less educated than those in the age group 55-64 (CFR, 2013: 2).
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children to school (instead of working, often in dangerous environments), and taking 
care of their wellbeing. This is why Handa and Davis (2006) emphasise dual objec-
tive of the programmes, based on human-capital development (long term) and the es-
tablishment of social nets i.e. poverty alleviation (short term). An additional effect of 
CCTs it that they constitute a very small share of GDP (up to 0.8%) and have a strong 
positive impact on inequality reduction with very good target group coverage.12 
CCTs can be considered an indigenous initiative, since they were initially 
designed without the help of development banks (Handa and Davis, 2006). They 
have originated in Latin America in mid 90s, and so far have expanded throughout 
the continent with the most prominent being in Brazil (Bolsa Familia) and Mexi-
co (Progresa). Positive effects of these programmes (in poverty alleviation and in-
equality reduction) have been noticed in other regions as well, most notably in West 
Africa and South East Asia, and some European countries (FYR Macedonia). Also, 
CCTs have been recognised by regional and international developing institutions 
that promote them as good practices for human-capacity development.
Finally, other instruments, traditional (such as nationalisation) or innovative 
(positive discrimination in education or equal access to the private job market) are 
also possible, and potentially as effective depending on local factors that may vary 
considerably. This is why there is no one-fit-all solution, and various responses 
should be implemented as long as they show positive effects on economic inequa-
lity reduction.
Conclusion
The growing importance of economic factors (including inequality) brings a new 
impetus in conflict research. It cannot be neglected anymore that these factors are 
becoming more significant, and with prolonged economic crisis possibly decisive 
for future incompatibility formations. As former ISA president, Craig Murphy, de-
scribes:
Forty years ago most observers expected the world’s income distribution to shift 
from what was considered a socially unstable bimodal form to the unimodal dis-
tribution that characterises most domestic societies. The incomes of the poor of 
South Asia, China, and Africa would grow to blend into those of the growing in-
comes of the world’s industrialising nations in Latin America, Southern Europe, 
and the Middle East. In turn, they would grow to blend with the incomes of West-
ern Europe and Japan, which would have joined the United States. Instead... the 
12 The most prominent is the case of Brazil where 21% of inequality decreases is achieved be-
cause of Bolsa Familia, and where up to 75% of beneficiaries fulfill all programme requirements 
(Soares et al., 2006; 2010).
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bulk of the world’s economic growth was accumulated by individuals within the 
wealthy OECD states, places where domestic income inequality has grown sharp-
ly as well. The bimodal distribution of world income has remained. (2001: 350)
The protractedness that Murphy depicts is a clear sign that inequalities (includ-
ing the economic ones) are rooted in the structure (Galtung, 1996), making them 
even more perilous (as part of structural violence) and difficult to resolve without 
a systemic change that so far has not been in the global agenda. Recent events, dis-
cussed in this paper, are an indicator that this phenomenon is generating social con-
sequences, which is why it must be addressed without any further delay. 
In this paper we have tried to analyse the main reasons that lead to the in-
creased importance of economic factors, but also to provide some possible expla-
nation on why a search for more can lead to violence, and how it can be prevented. 
The implementation of suggested policies depends on national efforts, but on the 
global context as well. Is seems that negative economic prospects present an op-
portunity for wide-ranging changes finally to be introduced. If it happens, results 
achieved in this way could prove to be significant for the design and implementa-
tion of development policies in the years to come. If not, it will increase the impor-
tance of economic inequalities with very negative prospects. 
Having in mind both potential outcomes, it appears that the time has come for 
the (in)equality to become a central issue in the world development debate, because 
ultimately, using the words of Gandhi, our planet has enough for everyone’s need, 
but not for everyone’s greed.
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